A problem the legal literature does not so far seem to provide much clarity about is whether, and when, the causes of invalidity or termination of a treaty operate automatically. The problem is generally presented as follows: when a cause of invalidity or termination arises, does the cause operate automatically, in the sense that anyone called upon to apply the treaty may judge whether the treaty is invalid or has been terminated and hence it is not to be applied, or is an international act of denunciation or some other equivalent international act necessary on the part of the state that intends to invoke the cause?
The positions put forward by contemporary legal scholars with respect to customary law, that is, in areas where the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not apply, confirm that non-automaticity is the preferred course. As far as customary law is concerned, there are no disputes as to the automatic nature -apart from expiration of the time -of original impossibility of performance, the emergence of a resolutive condition, or the extinction of a contracting state (unless succeeded by a new state). Similarly, legal scholars are fairly unanimous in holding that a denunciation or an equivalent act is needed where invalidity or termination stems from error, fraud, breach by a party or fundamental change of circumstances. There is, however, no agreement as to whether or not a violation of internal norms on treaty-making power, coercion of the state representative or a violation of jus cogens have an immediate impact on a treaty's validity; similarly, scholars disagree as to whether or not supervening impossibility of performance or war operate automatically. It should be noted for the sake of completeness that where denunciation or an equivalent act is considered necessary, disputes also arise as to the consequences deriving from the denunciation itself; thus scholars debate whether invalidity or termination operate by effect of the denunciation alone, or only after they have been ascertained by an international judge or by an agreement with the other contracting parties, or when any attempt to reach an agreement has failed.
2 These debates are, however, beyond the scope of this article; this paper is confined to the question of whether or not causes of invalidity or termination operate automatically.
2. Uncertainties and differences of opinion also arise in the literature dealing with the question of the automaticity of causes of invalidity and of termination in connection with the interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
It must be frankly recognized that the norms of the Vienna Convention governing the matter do not lend themselves to a sure solution. If one considers Articles 46-64, the provisions regulating the individual causes of invalidity and termination, the problem would seem to be solved: some of these provisions use expressions (like "A treaty ... shall be without any legal effect", or "A treaty is void...", or again "A treaty shall be considered as terminated...") which seem to start from the position that the causes of invalidity or termination referred to may be found by anyone called upon to apply the treaty, and hence may operate automatically. Others, use the formula "A state may invoke...", which seems instead to presuppose that the cause must in any case be invoked at the international level in order for it to be operative. But everything is thrown into debate again by Articles 65-68, from which one derives the impression that automaticity is excluded in every case.
Articles 65-68, as we know, lay down a complex international procedure for ascertaining the invalidity or termination of a treaty. The procedure begins with notification when one contracting state notifies the other contracting states of its intention to avail itself of a cause of invalidity or of termination (Article 65) and, if there is opposition by the other states, concludes either with a non-binding decision by the Conciliation Commission provided for by the Annex to the Convention or else, in cases where invalidity stems from a conflict with jus cogens, with a binding decision by the International Court of Justice (Article 66). Although the wording of Article 65(1) might lead one to think that this procedure applies only to some of the causes of termination or invalidity, 3 it in fact seems to concern all causes of invalid-ity and termination, not only those which in the light of the provisions cited above seem not to be automatic in nature. This must be the case, otherwise there is no way to explain why Article 66 explicitly mentions jus cogens, the cause of invalidity and termination which by the tenor of Articles 53 and 64 ought more than any cause, operate automatically. The truth is that Articles 65-68, taken together with the articles on the individual causes of invalidity and termination, leave one full of uncertainty and doubt Nor can illumination be derived from Article 69ff. regarding the "consequences" of invalidity and termination, since these articles speak of invalidity and termination that are "under" or "in accordance with the present Convention", and since, as the preparatory work shows, 4 this means under or in accordance with both the provisions regarding the individual causes and those contained in Articles 65-68! There is then no reason to'be surprised that a clear solution to the problem of the automaticity of the causes of invalidity or termination cannot be found in the legal scholarship dealing with the Vienna Convention. It may be noted in this connection that the thesis of automaticity meets with unanimity only in regard to abrogation by tacit mutual consent; that the thesis of non-automaticity in connection with violation of internal norms on treaty-making power, error, fraud, corruption, breach of the treaty by the other party, supervening impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances seems generally accepted; and that scholars split on the issue in connection with conclusion of the treaty by an unauthorized person (Convention Article 8), coercion of the representative of the state, coercion of the state, and violation (or supravenience) of a norm of jus cogens. Under the Vienna Convention the consequences resulting from an act of denunciation and in particular from a state's notification, pursuant to Article 65, of its intent to invoke a cause of invalidity or termination remain uncertain. Scholars debate whether, during the procedure pursuant to Articles 65-68, a state ought to continue to apply the treaty or it may provisionally suspend its application. In addition, there is disagreement as to whether, if one of the parties refuses to accept the conclusion of the Conciliation Commission, the claim to invalidity or termination remains paralyzed indefinitely.
6 But as we already noted in connection with the debates concerning customary law, these issues are outside the scope of the present study. 3. In the following pages we seek to resolve the problem concerning automaticity of the causes of invalidity or termination of treaties by considering the case law of the national courts.
Given that the focus here is on case law, automaticity is here seen from the standpoint of the national judge. What we wish to establish, in short, is whether the invalidity or termination of a treaty can be found by any domestic judge called upon to apply it, and when, if ever, it must instead be the object of a formal act of denunciation or an equivalent declaration in international law. What we discover with respect to the competence of the national judge may then be applied to other domestic legal operators (government officials, public bodies, and in general anyone called upon to apply the law or to secure compliance with it within the state).
It should be quite clear that the alternative we posit is between a finding by a domestic judge and a formal act of the state addressed to the other contracting parties. We are not interested here in issues, solved in different ways in the various domestic legal systems, concerning the degree of deference the judiciary affords the Executive when deciding questions of international law. 7 In other words, what we are interested in establishing is whether a domestic judge may find a cause of invalidity or termination irrespective of whether he must, in order to make his decision, ask for a more or less binding opinion from the organs of the Executive.
The consideration of domestic case law we shall engage in is inspired by the thesis, supported for some time now by one of the authors of this article, 8 that the effectiveness of international law follows from its application by domestic "legal operators" (as defined above), in particular, national judges, and hence must be founded upon a strengthening of the role of the latter. Understood in this way, our consideration seeks to verify whether domestic case law supports -or at least shows trends in favour of -a working hypothesis based on this theory regarding the need to strengthen the role of national judges.
Our working hypothesis is that automaticity and the power of denunciation are not mutually exclusive, but concurrent. All the causes of invalidity and of termination may be invoked by anyone called upon to apply the treaty -and for the purpose that interests us here, by domestic judges -and all causes may be the object of a formal act of denunciation or an equivalent act. A domestic judge's finding and a state's denunciation at the international level fulfill different functions and have different effects.
A domestic judge's finding constitutes an integral part of his decision establishing whether a treaty applies to a particular case, a decision which inter alia involves the application of all international customary rules relating to the conclusion, modification and termination of treaties. As a Dutch judge called upon to decide whether the Mannheim Convention of 1868 concerning navigation on the Rhine still applied in 19S0 to relationships between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany once stated:
[S]ince the origin and the cessation of international obligations arising from treaties are governed by customary international law and since the Netherlands courts are competent and therefore obliged to apply that law also, those courts must independently judge the question if and how far the provisions of the Convention of Mannheim apply to a particular case.?
The domestic judge's decision, however -and this is the limit of automaiicityonly affects the particular case at issue. In other words, the judge's finding regarding the treaty's validity or termination may be found not to apply in a different case, just as judicial application of any legal rule, whether international or domestic, may vary from one case to another.
A formal act of denunciation or any such similar manifestation of intent serves a purpose entirely different from that of a domestic court holding. By denouncing a treaty at the international level, a state proclaims its intent to free itself once and for all from its contractual commitment. Such a manifestation of intent, when it is not the exercise of a power of denunciation explicitly provided for in the treaty (that is, when it is not itself an independent cause of termination) but is founded on another cause of invalidity or termination, is never indispensable; if a state formally denounces a treaty, it is to bring out certainly and definitely the fact that in its view the treaty is not applicable or no longer applicable as a result of its being invalid or terminated. It is clear, then, that once the state has manifested its intent in this way, its own legal operators, including its own judges, are bound thereby, provided of course that the manifestation of intent emanates from the agencies which have the competence to denounce treaties. It is also clear that the manifestation of intent has no binding effect on either the legal operators or judges of the other Contracting Parties. This is our working hypothesis. Let the case law now speak.
4. Starting with the causes of invalidity -which for a good proportion of legal scholars do not in principle operate automatically -it seems to us that almost all of the judgments we have considered have actually held just the opposite. In this con- The Court agrees with the argument of the defendant. The German-Czechoslovak Nationality Treaty was invalid because it was concluded under clear and unlawful duressthe effect of which Czechs could not escape -exercised by Germany against Czechoslovakia. It must therefore be accepted that the defendant at the moment when the Netherlands Decree concerning Enemy Property entered into force did not possess German nationality in the sense of that Decree.
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It should be noted that the Arnhem Court of Appeals made a contrary finding in 1952, reversing the Amhem District Court's decision. 12 The Court of Appeals found the question of whether treaties concluded under threat of armed force ought to be regarded as "null and void" to be "controversial" and decided that in any case the Treaty of 20 November 1938 had to be taken into account, given that Czechoslovakia had "in fact" complied with the provisions of the Treaty itself. Even though the Appeals Court embraced the thesis still supported by some legal scholars in the 1950's, 13 namely, that duress against the state, as opposed to duress on the state representative, does not constitute a cause of nullity, the appellate judgment con- firms our working hypothesis: It is clearly based on the assumption that the domestic court had the competence to decide the validity of the 1938 Treaty. Moreover, by departing from the other judgments, it highlights the limits that characterize the decision of the judge, or of anyone else called upon to apply the treaty, namely that such decisions, be they right or wrong, are valid only for the specific case.
Apart from a few other verdicts again dealing with coercion of the state as a whole 14 or asserting, in rather general terms, domestic court competence to decide the validity of treaties, 13 particular emphasis should be placed on the decisions affirming domestic court's competence to decide the validity of a treaty said to be contrary to peremptory rules of general international law (jus cogens However, the majority of the decisions that can be cited in favour of the power of domestic courts to adjudicate the validity of treaties concern the question of respect for internal norms on treaty-making power. In large part, these judgments ask, and answer, the question of whether agreements concluded in simplified form (without ratification), or at any rate concluded without the assent of Parliament, are valid where ratification and assent are provided for by the Constitution. As far as de- ally interwoven to such an extent that they are, more often than not, inseparable.
In fact, what is important for national courts to decide is whether a treaty should, despite a procedural flaw in its conclusion, be applied in the specific case. And the fact that the courts feel that they are able to take a decision of this type is sufficient to confirm our working hypothesis. Admittedly, there also are decisions decisively opposed to the notion that domestic courts have the competence to judge the validity of treaties, even despite the fact that domestic judicial decisions are limited to the specific case. Among these are, for instance, the judgments of the Colombian Supreme Court of 6 December 1930, 33 and of the High Court of Calcutta of 11 August 1954, 34 Cases of this type are, however, few and far between.
Finally, special mention should be made of the judgment of the District Court of The Hague of 20 May 1986 in which the court refused to find the Convention regarding the installation of United States cruise missiles in The Netherlands -challenged by 14,774 natural and legal persons -as contrary to international jus cogens? 5 The refusal was motivated, among other things, by the court's belief that under international law "the national courts are not designated as the body empowered to assess whether a concluded or ratified treaty or any part of it is void." Is this judgment clearly opposed to the viewpoint supported here? Does it also represent a departure from a trend which, as derived from the decisions reported above, finds its strongest support in Dutch case law? An affirmative answer is clearly incorrect if one considers that in the case in point what the court was being asked was not to refrain from applying the agreement on the missiles to a specific case but to declare it void once and for all. 5. Let us now move to the causes of the termination (or suspension) of treaties. For these causes too, as for those of invalidity, the trend that emerges from a consideration of the case law is undoubtedly in favour of the competence of domestic courts to assess whether or not a treaty is terminated (or suspended) and hence whether or not it should be applied in a specific instance. It may indeed be said that this trend towards recognition of domestic court competence is clearly evident with respect to all the causes of termination or suspension other than change of circumstances (the There are also many judgments relating to the effects of war on treaties, which can be interpreted as clearly supportive of domestic courts' power to decide the question of termination of treaties.
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In connection with judgments on war, one fact of considerable importance for our purposes should be noted. As we know, the traditional thesis, namely that war causes the termination of treaties, supported for instance by German case law after the end of the First World War, 40 has not been followed in case law subsequent to 1945. The idea that has instead made headway -affirmed from the end of last century in American case law -is that only those agreements which due to their nature, the subject they deal with and the interests they protect are incompatible with the state 
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If the observations contained in these two decisions and a few more or less similar cases 43 are correct, it must perforce be concluded, as one of the authors of this article has long maintained and others have begun to maintain recently, 44 that the effects of war on treaties are not of independent significance but instead constitute an application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus. This means that the attitude of the national courts, which on the one hand consider that they can autonomously decide the effects of war, while on the other hand tend to maintain as we shall see that the change in circumstances provides only the competence to denounce the treaty at international level, is entirely contradictory.
Similar observations can be made with reference to the case law regarding the termination of treaties because of supervening impossibility of performance, if, as we feel is proper, one accepts the thesis that termination for supervening impossi-bility again constitutes an application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus. 4S The few decisions regarding supervening impossibility clearly start from the premise that a domestic court may judge whether this cause of termination exists in order to decide whether or not to apply the treaty to the case in point For instance, in refusing to apply the treaty concluded by Prussia and Luxembourg in 1909 for the prevention of double taxation, the German Reichsfinanzhof (judgment of 18 June 1930) decided: "[W]hatever might be the international validity of the treaty in question, it had now lost its object seeing that the Federal State [Prussia] could no longer collect the income tax."
46 Inapplicability of the treaty was also arrived at by the Tribunal de Commerce of Saint-Etienne (France), in a judgment of 17 January 1936, which found that performance, consisting in a movement of currency from Italy, had become impossible because of measures taken by the Italian government in response to sanctions decreed by the League of Nations. 47 Finally, impossibility of performance is dealt with in a recent verdict of the Italian Court of Cassation (14 December 1984 n. 6570) dealing with the limit for compensation for damages provided for by the 1929 Warsaw Convention on international air transport which had been set in "Poincare' gold francs"; the court held that the disappearance of the currency did not result in the inapplicability of the Convention itself. quiescence by the Netherlands; 50 a rather interesting judgment of the Austrian Constitutional Court of 1973 which, to demonstrate the abrogation of a treaty between Germany and Austria, refers to both the conduct of the Austrian "administrative authorities" and to the absence of protests by the German government.
51 These holdings deserve emphasis due to the fact that abrogation for desuetude is a rather controversial cause of termination 32 and that ascertainment of the conduct determining abrogation (facta concludentia) is a delicate business. Since the judgments do not refrain from declaring the treaties at issue terminated and inapplicable, they are of particular significance.
Finally, the power of domestic courts to decide whether a treaty has been terminated is also affirmed in the case law in connection with breach of diplomatic relations 5^ and with abrogation because of incompatibility with subsequent treaties?* 6. As was said, the sole causes of termination or suspension with regard to which domestic courts tend to deny their own power -as long as the state has not seen fit to denounce the treaty or in some way indicate its intent to rid itself of it at international level -are change of circumstances and breach of the treaty. of performance are referable to the principle of rebus sic stantibus and that with respect to these two causes of termination or invalidity the trend of the case law is clearly in the direction of independence in judicial decision-making. The possibility of independent decision-making is also the line taken by a number of decisions reported by us in connection with succession of states, specifically, in connection with the continuity or otherwise of treaties in the event of major changes in the constitutional structure of a state; these decisions argue in terms fairly close to those used when discussing the principle of rebus sic stantibus. 59 All this undoubtedly means, as we have already said, that there is a contradiction between the decisions specifically devoted to this principle and the others. But does it not also mean that the tendency as regards change of circumstances has a very slight, indeed negligible, effect on our claim that domestic courts have the power to decide such issues?
Again, as regards termination (or suspension) of treaties for breach by another contracting state (the principle of inadimplenti non est adimplendum), the case law is in favour of the state's exclusive power to denounce the treaty, or to take steps toward or have recourse to measures needed to secure its observance. 60 Decisions going in this direction have been handed down in courts of the United States, 61 England, 62 Switzerland, 63 France, 64 68 and the Dutch judgments concerning the Convention on the Rhine Navigation, in which the courts of the Netherlands refused to apply the Convention to Germany after 1936 and for a period after the Second World War, because inter alia of its non-application by Germany. 69 The domestic courts* tendency not to apply the principle of inadimplenti non est adimplendum -an attitude which can have no other justification than the need to consider the "political" relevance of decisions relating to any type of measure which may be treated as an international reprisal -should in our view be criticized, though it is by far the practice of the majority of courts. It should specifically be criticized from the viewpoint of a "juridical" administration of international law which favors making maximum use of domestic courts when applying international law; from this viewpoint the Dutch case law seems exemplary. A different issue, obviously, is the means by which domestic courts may ascertain another contracting state's breach of a Treaty; in this there is nothing to rule out their availing themselves of the executive's cooperation. 7. At this point it may be said that the consideration of the case law we have carried out supports, with a few (criticizablc) exceptions our working hypothesis, namely that domestic judges have the power to adjuge all causes of invalidity and termination, with their holdings, of course, being limited to the specific case. From this viewpoint, then, all causes of invalidity and termination operate automatically.
Again, according to the working hypothesis put forward, denunciation at the international level or an equivalent act addressed to the other contracting parties is not an alternative to automaticity but rather may be concluded for all causes of invalidity or termination so as to allow a state to free itself once and for all of its contractual obligations. Moreover, such declarations, provided they are made in compliance with the internal rules on the power to denounce treaties, 71 bind the courts of the denouncing state; they have no value -unless authorized by the treaty and hence in itself constituting an independent cause of termination -for the courts of other states. 8. In light of the observations made so far, one may perhaps give an interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which eliminates the contradictions and uncertainties we mentioned earlier, and allows the procedures provided for by Articles 65 ff. of the Convention, namely the procedures through which the state may assert a cause of termination, to be set more exactly in their framework.
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Article 65ff. govern the denunciation of treaties and the possible disputes that may arise in the event of opposition to the denunciation by the other contracting states and introduce, in derogation from customary law, particular forms, timing and modalities. They deal, in short, with what a state must do at the international level when it intends to free itself once and for all from a treaty. From this point of view Articles 65ff. apply to all causes of invalidity or termination. Seen this way, they are not in contradiction with the Convention rules governing the individual causes of invalidity and termination, since these rules, over and above the diversity of their wording, deal with the definitive, as it were, invalidity or termination of the treaty, and are hence all subordinate in procedural terms to the international actions of states.
The Vienna Convention does not seem instead to consider the possibility that the causes of invalidity and termination may be ascertained, with effect confined to the individual specific case, by whoever has to apply the treaty and for the point that interests us by the domestic judge. At any rate, the Convention certainly does not forbid domestic courts from deciding the validity of a treaty. It would, in short, be absurd to maintain that the domestic judge of a contracting state to the Convention would be condemned to paralysis as long as his own state had not set the procedures of Articles 65 ff. in motion and, in the event of opposition, until the controversy with the opponents had not been settled. Any blanket condemnation of the competence of domestic courts would have to be derived from an explicit provision of the Convention; it cannot be derived from a system clearly concerned only with disputes arising at the international level.
The interpretation maintained here is not contradicted by the sole domestic court decision known to us that refers to the procedure provided for in Articles 65 ff., specifically, the Dutch judgment previously cited ( This judgment rules out the possibility that a domestic judge may declare the invalidity of a treaty not only on the basis of the Vienna Convention but also on that of general international law; thus, it is contrary to the whole of the case law (particularly Dutch!) discussed above. But, as we have already noted, the decision can be explained by the fact that in the case in point the Court had been requested (by 14,774 natural and legal persons) not to refuse to apply the Convention on the missiles to the specific case but to declare the Convention null and void, once and for all -something which a domestic court cannot do regardless of whether or not the state to which that court belongs is a contracting party to the Vienna Convention.
9. In conclusion, the problem of whether and which causes of invalidity and termination of treaties operate automatically and which do not is ultimately a problem wrongly posed. Automaticity is not an alternative to international procedures aimed at ascertaining whether a given treaty is void or has been terminated. All the causes of invalidity or termination can either be the object of international procedures or be ascertained, with effects confined to the specific case, by whoever has to apply the treaty and, in particular, by national judges. Of course, if a judge's decision (perhaps taken by agreement with the Executive) 85 is wrong, the state to which the court belongs will incur international responsibility, as happens in all cases of domestic decisions contrary to international law; but this will be a responsibility which is itself confined to a specific case.
If this is the way things are, there is no sense at all in speaking, in connection with international treaties as is done with contracts in domestic law, of nullity or annullability, of nullity to be invoked either by anyone at any time or only by those interested and so on. The only important distinction is the one between invalidity or termination operating definitively following denunciation at the international level and invalidity or termination that can be found for the purposes of application of the treaty to the specific case. The fact that all the causes of invalidity or termination can be adjudged by domestic courts contributes to rendering the uncertainty as regards the fate of treaties less bothersome. This uncertainty characterizes international procedures where they do not consist of compulsory arbitration.
The power of domestic courts has been derived here from an examination of the case law. We have seen that this power is not in conflict with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Moreover, it is not evident to us that its exercise has ever, ay such, given rise to protest by states in some way concerned by non-application of a treaty to an individual specific case. Accordingly, it is a power which does not meet with any obstacles at the level of international law.
See supra pan 3 and note 7.
